'Gulf War Illness Assessment

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'Gulf War Illness Assessment

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This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-833T

entitled 'Gulf War Illnesses: Preliminary Assessment of DOD Plume

Modeling for U.S. Troops' Exposure to Chemical Agents' which was

released on June 02, 2003.


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Testimony:


Before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,

and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform:


United States General Accounting Office:


GAO:


For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT:


Monday, June 2, 2003:


Gulf War Illnesses:


Preliminary Assessment of DOD Plume Modeling for U.S. Troops' Exposure to Chemical Agents:


Statement of Keith Rhodes, Chief Technologist

Center for Technology and Engineering, Applied Research and Methods:

GAO-03-833T:

GAO Highlights:


Highlights of GAO-03-833T, a testimony before the House Subcommittee

on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,

Committee on Government Reform


Why GAO Did This Study:


Of the approximately 700,000 veterans of the Persian Gulf War, many

have undiagnosed illnesses. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have concluded, using computer plume

modeling, that no U.S. troops were exposed to hazardous substances

because plumes—clouds of chemical warfare agents—could not have

reached the troops. GAO was asked to assess DOD and CIA plume

modeling to determine whether DOD’s conclusions could be supported.

GAO’s final assessment will be reported at a later date.


what GAO Found:


DOD’s conclusion as to the extent of U.S. troops’ exposure is highly

questionable because DOD and CIA plume modeling results are not

reliable. In general, modeling is never precise enough to draw

definitive conclusions, and DOD did not have accurate information on

source term (such as the quantity and purity—concentration—of the

agent) and meteorological conditions (such as the wind and weather

patterns), essential to valid modeling. In particular, the models DOD

selected were not fully developed and validated for long-range

environmental fallout; the source term assumptions were not accurate;

the plume height was underestimated; the modeling only considered the

effects on health of a single bombing; field-testing at Dugway Proving

Ground did not realistically simulate the actual bombing conditions;

and divergence in results among models.


DOD’s conclusion, based on the findings of epidemiological studies--

that there was no significant difference between rates of illness for

exposed versus not exposed troops--is not valid. In the

epidemiological studies, the results of DOD’s flawed modeling served

as a key criterion for determining the exposure classification—exposed

versus not exposed to chemical agents—of the troops. Such

misclassification is a serious problem that can have two types of

effects: First, if misclassification affects both comparison groups

equally (nondifferential classification-- equally in the exposed and

unexposed groups), it may water down the results so that important

associations are missed. Second, if misclassification affects one

group more than the other (differential misclassification), it may

introduce bias that obscures important associations or creates false

associations. Consequently, the misclassification in the studies

resulted in confounding—that is, distorting—the results, making the

conclusion invalid.


http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-833T


To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Keith Rhodes at (202) 512-6412 or

rhodesk@gao.gov.


[End of section]


Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:


We are pleased to be here today to present our preliminary assessment

of the plume modeling conducted by DOD and CIA to determine the

number of U.S. troops that might have been exposed to the release of

chemical warfare agents during the Gulf War in 1990. We will report the

final results of this study at a later date.


As you know, many of the approximately 700,000 veterans of the Persian

Gulf War have undiagnosed illnesses since the war's end in 1991. Some

fear they are suffering from chronic disabling conditions because of

wartime exposures to vaccines, as well as chemical warfare agents,

pesticides, and other hazardous substances with known or suspected

adverse health effects. Available bomb damage assessments during the

war showed that of the 21 sites bombed in Iraq--categorized by

intelligence agencies as nuclear, biological, or chemical facilities--

16 had been destroyed by bombing. Some of these sites were near the

areas where U.S. troops were located.


When the issue of the possible exposure of troops to low levels of

chemical warfare agents was first raised, during the summer of 1993,

the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) concluded that no U.S. troops were exposed because (1) there were

no forward-deployed chemical warfare agent munitions and (2) plumes--

clouds of chemical warfare agents--from the bombing that destroyed the

chemical facilities could not have reached the troops.


This position was maintained until 1996, when it became known that U.S.

troops destroyed a stockpile of chemical munitions after the Gulf War

in 1991, at a forward-deployed site, Khamisiyah, in Iraq. Consequently,

DOD and the CIA made several modeling efforts to estimate the number of

troops that might have been potentially exposed to chemical warfare

agents. But recognizing that actual data on the source term--such as

the quantity and the purity (concentration) of the agent--and

meteorological conditions--such as the wind and the weather patterns--

were not available,[Footnote 1] DOD and CIA conducted field-testing and

modeling of bombing sites at Khamisiyah, in 1996 and 1997, to determine

the size and path of the plume, as well as the number of U.S. troops

exposed to the plume. During these initial modeling efforts, DOD asked

the Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories

(LLNL) to also conduct modeling. In 1997, DOD and CIA also combined a

number of their own individual modeling efforts into a composite and

conducted additional plume modeling of the bombing sites at Al

Muthanna, Muhammadiyat, and Ukhaydir. Subsequently, in 2000, DOD

revised its modeling of Khamisiyah.


In our testimony today, at your request, my remarks will focus on our

preliminary findings of DOD and CIA plume modeling during the Gulf War.

Specifically, I will address the validity of the following DOD

conclusions:


* based on DOD plume modeling efforts, that the extent to which U.S.

troops were exposed was minimal and:


* based on findings of government-funded epidemiological studies, that

there was no significant difference as to the rate of illness between

troops that were exposed to chemical warfare agents versus those not

exposed.


Our work thus far has involved interviews with agency officials and

experts in this area, reviews of relevant documents and literature, and

a review of DOD's methodology and analyses of plume modeling. Our work

has been performed in accordance with generally accepted government

auditing standards.


Summary:


DOD's conclusion as to the extent of U.S. troops' exposure--based on

DOD and CIA plume modeling--is highly questionable because the results

of the modeling are unreliable. In general, modeling is never precise

enough to draw definitive conclusions, and DOD did not have accurate

information on source term and meteorological conditions.


We have several reasons for this assessment: First, DOD selected models

that were not fully developed and validated for modeling long-range

environmental fallout. Second, some of the assumptions regarding the

source term data used in the modeling were not accurate--based on

incomplete information, data that were not validated, and testing that

did not realistically simulate the actual conditions at Khamisiyah. For

example, the CIA calculated the agent purity in 1991 to be 50 percent

at Khamisiyah, but 18 percent at Al Muthanna and about 15 percent at

Muhammadiyat. The CIA did not independently validate or establish agent

purity levels based on empirically driven analyses, and relied on

UNSCOM reporting for these rates. This assessment of the agent purity

rate at Al Muthanna was questioned by a DOD official. We plan to

examine the validity of the methodology used to calculated the rate of

degradation.


Third, the plume height was underestimated, which resulted in

discounting the impact of certain meteorological conditions, such as

high-speed winds at nighttime, when many of the bombings occurred. This

would have a dramatic effect on the distance the chemical agent

traveled. Moreover, according to an internal DOD memo, plume height in

one case at Al Muthanna was arbitrarily determined by a DOD official to

be 10 meters. At Muhammadiyat and Ukhaydir, plume heights were

estimated to be the height of the munition or the munition stack.

However, independent field-testing demonstrated that a single 1,000-

pound bomb would create plume height in excess of 400 meters above the

ground. Fourth, DOD, in its modeling, only considered the effect of a

single bombing of the sites on the health of the U.S. troops. But DOD

did not take into account the cumulative effects of repeated bombings

of the sites on troops' health. Fifth, post-war field-testing done at

Dugway Proving Ground, to estimate the source term data and plume

height, did not realistically simulate the actual conditions of

bombings at any of the sites. The simulation occurred under conditions

that were not comparable to those that existed at Khamisiyah. For

example, there were differing seasonal and meteorological conditions,

differences in rocket construction, and lesser quantities of rockets.

These differences result in multi-variable uncertainty that cannot be

resolved. Finally, there was a great divergence among the various

models DOD selected with regard to the size and path of the plume and

the extent to which troops were exposed. Combining the results of

various models masked the highly divergent predictions among the

individual models regarding the size and path of the plume. The results

of LLNL model which showed the largest area of coverage were

disregarded and not included in the composite model.


DOD's conclusion that there were no significant differences in the rate

of illness between exposed and non-exposed troops is questionnable. DOD

based this conclusion on the findings of epidemiological studies, in

which DOD modeling was flawed. In addition, the modeling results served

as a key criterion for classifying troops that were ill and had been

exposed compared with troops that were ill and determined not to have

been exposed. However, the troops classified as non-exposed might have

been exposed. Such misclassification is a serious problem that can have

two types of effects. First, if misclassification affects both

comparison groups equally (non-differential classification--equally in

the exposed and unexposed groups), it may water down the results so

that important associations are missed. Second, if misclassification

affects one group more than the other (differential misclassification),

it may introduce bias that obscures important associations or creates

false associations. Consequently, the misclassification in the studies

resulted in confounding--that is, distorting--the results.


Background:


In March 1991, after the conclusion of the Gulf War, U.S. Army

demolition units destroyed munitions at the Khamisiyah storage site--

which included a bunker and an open pit--in southeastern Iraq. Later,

through inspections conducted by the United Nations Special Commission

(UNSCOM) in Iraq, it was discovered that hundreds of 122-millimeter

rockets destroyed at Khamisiyah contained the nerve agents sarin and

cyclosarin. U.S. and coalition forces also bombed many other known or

suspected Iraqi chemical warfare research, materiel, storage, and

production sites. According to DOD and the CIA, coalition air strikes

resulted in damage to filled chemical munitions at only two facilities

in central Iraq, Al Muthanna bunker 2 and Muhammadiyat, and at the

Ukhaydir ammunition storage depot in southern Iraq. At Muhammadiyat,

munitions containing an estimated 2.9 metric tons of sarin and

cyclosarin and 15 metric tons of the chemical agent mustard were

damaged during the air strikes. At Al Muthanna, munitions containing an

estimated 17 metric tons of sarin and cyclosarin were damaged during

the air strikes.


According to DOD, the U.S. Government did not immediately make the

connection between the chemical munitions found by UNSCOM at Khamisiyah

and U.S. demolition bombings there. However, in 1996, concerns raised

by the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Illnesses prompted

the CIA to examine this issue.[Footnote 2] The CIA contracted with the

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to conduct the

initial analysis and modeling of the bombing of chemical munitions in

Khamisiyah bunker 73. The CIA's first report, published in August 1996,

modeled the potential release of agents from bunker 73. The CIA and DOD

jointly published a second report in September 1997. In this report,

they combined the results of five different dispersions (for example,

the size and path of the plume) and meteorological models to determine

the extent of the plume from bombing of chemical munitions in

Khamisiyah. In 2000, DOD published the results of a new modeling of the

Khamisiyah site, using updated CIA source assessments and revising the

hazard area.


Information Needed for Modeling the Effects of Chemical Warfare Agents:


In chemical plume modeling, simulations are produced that recreate or

predict the size and path of the plume, including the potential hazard

area, and the potential effect on the health of the exposed population.

Modeling requires accurate information on:


* source term characteristics, properties (for example, vapor pressure,

flash point, size of particles, persistency, and toxicity information),

and rate of the agent release;


* temporal characteristics of the period of release (for example,

whether the initial release of chemical agent occurred during daylight

hours when it might rapidly disperse into the surface air or at night

when differing dispersion patterns would exist depending on terrain and

the height of the release);


* accurate collection of data that drive the meteorological models,

such as temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, dew point, wind

velocity and direction at varying altitudes, and other related

measurements of weather conditions during the modeled period;


* data from global weather models to simulate large-scale weather

patterns and from regional and localized weather models to simulate the

weather in the area of the chemical agent release and throughout the

area of dispersion; and:


* information regarding the location of potentially exposed

populations, animals, crops or other assets that may be affected by

releases of the agent.


Types of Models Used:


The modeling of various chemical agent releases during the 1991 Persian

Gulf War included global-scale models, such as the National Centers for

Environmental Prediction Global Data Assimilation System (GDAS) and the

Naval Operational Global Atmospheric Prediction System (NOGAPS).

Regional and local weather models used included the Coupled Ocean-

Atmosphere Mesoscale Prediction System (COAMPS), the Operational

Multiscale Environment Model with Grid Adaptivity (OMEGA), and the

Mesoscale Model Version 5 (MM5).


Transport and diffusion models (often simply called dispersion models)

were also used. They project both the path of the chemical agents after

release and the degree of hazard posed by the agents. For example, the

modeling of various releases during the 1991 Gulf War included

dispersion models, such as the Second-order Closure Integrated Puff

(SCIPUFF) model along with its Hazard Prediction and Assessment

Capability (HPAC) component; the Vapor, Liquid, and Solid Tracking

(VLSTRACK) model; the Non-Uniform Simple Surface Evaporation Model

(NUSSE); and the Atmospheric Dispersion by Particle-in-Cell (ADPIC)

model.


DOD's Conclusions Regarding the Extent of Exposure of U.S. Troops Are

Highly Questionable:


DOD's conclusion as to the extent of U.S. troops' exposure--based on

DOD and CIA plume modeling--is highly questionable because the results

of the modeling are unreliable. The modeling conducted was not precise

enough to draw definitive conclusions regarding the size and path of

the plume. We found six reasons to question the conclusions: First, the

models selected were not fully developed and validated. Second, the

assumptions regarding the source term used in the modeling were not

accurate. Third, the plume height was underestimated. Fourth, DOD

modeling only considered the effects of a single bomb on health. Fifth,

post-war field testing done at Dugway Proving Ground did not

realistically simulate the actual conditions of bombing at any site.

And, finally, there was a great divergence among the various models DOD

selected with regard to the size and path of the plume.


The Models Selected Were Not Fully Developed and Validated:


DOD and CIA officials selected in-house models for use in plume

modeling (see appendix 1). In the case of Khamisiyah and other sites,

DOD models--such as the VLSTRACK and HPAC/SCIPUFF dispersion models--

were not fully developed and validated for environmental fallout at the

time of their selection. In particular, these models were not

appropriate for long-range tracking of chemical agents.


VLSTRACK was developed primarily as a tactical decision aid for

predicting hazards resulting from the release of chemical and

biological agents in a military environment. Modeling experts at the

Naval Surface Center told us that the two-month DOD panel reanalysis

and modeling was a developmental effort because existing models did not

have the capability to perform the required projections. Considerations

of potential illness from low-level exposure to chemical agents

resulting from nerve and blister agents accidentally released in Iraq

required extensive extensions and modifications to some of the

methodology in VLSTRACK.


HPAC was developed jointly by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the

then Defense Special Weapons Agency (now known as DTRA) and was

specifically tailored to do counterproliferation contingency planning.

In a 1998 scientific review and evaluation of SCIPUFF, which is an

integral part of HPAC, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration's (NOAA's) Air Resources Laboratory stated that SCIPUFF

is probably better suited for short-range (about 10 kilometers)

dispersion applications rather than for long-range transport modeling.

Among the limitations cautioned regarding the use of the HPAC model are

that does not provide a definitive answer due to uncertainties about

transport, location, and weather.


In addition, based on the DOD modeling effort, it is evident that a

group using the VLSTRACK model might receive a significantly different

prediction from that of a group using the HPAC model. And neither of

these models has sufficient fidelity--that is, reliability--to permit

the conclusion that the actual hazard area--that is, path of the plume-

-is confined to the predicted hazard area. In a September 1998 memo,

the Deputy to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and

Chemical/Biological Defense cited a DOD panel study team, which found

that the VLSTRACK and HPAC models generate hazard predictions that are

significantly different from each other. The memo noted, "This occurred

even when the source terms and weather inputs are as simple and as

identical as possible. In operational deployment, the average model

user could obtain different answers for the same threat.":


With regard to meteorological models, according to a 1997 memo from the

Director of NOAA's Air Resources Laboratory to DOD, the selection of

models was dominated by in-house, that is, DOD, models that were not

well known outside of DOD. The Director noted that there were three

mainstream mesoscale models available and well accepted for deriving

site-specific flow conditions from large-scale meteorological

information: MM5, RAMS, and Eta. At that time, OMEGA and COAMPS were

too new and not well accepted outside of DOD circles. OMEGA was still

under development, and a Peer Review Panel on the 1997 Khamisiyah

modeling reported that there were major problems with the OMEGA model.

For example, there were physically impossible aspects to the OMEGA

model solutions and major errors in its simulations. For the analysis

done for Khamisiyah and Al Muthanna, a DOD technical review panel found

that OMEGA consistently under-predicted surface wind speeds by a factor

of 2 to 3 when compared with actual observations collected at five

World Meteorological stations in the area.


The Source Term Assumptions Were Not Accurate:


There were significant uncertainties in the source term used in the

plume modeling at Khamisiyah. DOD and the CIA made assumptions about

the source term based on field-testing, intelligence information,

imagery, UNSCOM inspections, and Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM. However,

these assumptions were based on incomplete information, data that were

not validated, and testing that did not realistically simulate the

actual conditions at Khamisiyah.


In its initial modeling of the demolition of chemical munitions at

Khamisiyah, the CIA did not have accurate and precise information as to

how rockets with chemical warheads would be affected by open pit

demolition, compared with bunker demolition. This lack of information

included the number of rockets, agent purity, and amount of agent

released in the atmosphere, agent reaction in an open-pit demolition,

and prevailing meteorological conditions. A DOD panel also found a lack

of information,[Footnote 3] that is, substantial uncertainties

regarding the number of damaged rockets that might have released

chemical agents and how fast the nerve agents--sarin and cyclosarin,

which were mixed together in the rockets--were released. Some of these

agents may have leaked from rockets into the soil or into the wood of

the boxes that contained the rockets and evaporated over time. The

panel also found that the CIA and SAIC analyses used what were

essentially guesses for the lack of data. For example, the numbers of

rockets were based on what was known to be there before the demolition

and what was found by the UNSCOM during their inspections, but,

according to a DOD panel, the numbers varied by a factor of 5 or 6.


In addition, this panel recognized that meteorological data were

limited because there were relatively few observations, and these were

made far from the Khamisiyah site. Observations were few because Iraq

stopped reporting weather station measurement information to the World

Meteorological Organization in 1981. As a result, data on the

meteorological conditions during the Gulf War were sparse. The only

data that were available were for the surface wind observation site, 80

to 90 kilometers away, and the upper atmospheric site, about 200

kilometers away. The panel also recognized that wind patterns could

contain areas of bifurcation--lines where winds move in one direction

on one side and in another direction on another side--which also move

over time and are different at different altitudes.


Source term assumptions on agents (sarin and cyclosarin) purity

established for the four sites--Khamisiyah, as well as Al Muthanna,

Muhammadiyat, and Ukhaydir--differed widely. Discrepancies between the

Khamisiyah purity data and the Al Muthanna and Muhammadiyat data were

not adequately resolved. The agents were assumed to be purer in

February 1991 at Al Muthanna than in January at Muhammadiyat and purer

still in March at Khamisiyah. In each case, agent purity was a key

factor in the DOD and CIA methodology for determining the amount of

agents released. Since the purity of the sarin and cyclosarin was used

as a factor in calculating the amount of agents released, purity is

critical in compounding the uncertainty of the modeling. For example,

for modeling purposes, 10 tons of agent with a purity of 18 percent

would be represented as only 1.8 tons of agent. The CIA did not

independently validate or establish agent purity levels based on

empirically driven analyses, and relied on UNSCOM reporting for these

rates. This assessment of the agent purity rate at Al Muthanna was

questioned by a DOD official, who noted in a memo, "Why we use the 18

percent purity instead of the 50 percent number available in public

sources, and why we treat GF like GB when there are documents that

mention the higher toxicity are not easily deferred with 'because the

CIA says so.' I think the GF vs. GB numbers accepted by the EPA or CDC

or whatever is the competent authority, but the purity number is

problematic." We plan to examine the validity of the methodology used

to calculated the rate of degradation.


In addition, according to Iraqi production records obtained by UNSCOM,

the agent purity at Khamisiyah, in early January 1991, was about 55

percent. The agent subsequently degraded to 10-percent purity by the

time laboratory analysis had been completed on samples taken by UNSCOM

from one of the rockets in October 1991. On the basis of the sample

purity and indications that the degradation rate for sarin and

cyclosarin are similar, the CIA assessed that the ratio of sarin to

cyclosarin when the munitions were blown up in March 1991 was the same

as that sampled in October 1991--3:1. According to the CIA, assuming a

conservative exponential degradation of the sarin and cyclosarin, the

purity on the date of demolition, 2 months after production, was

calculated to be about 50 percent.


At Al Muthanna, however, where the agent was stored in a bunker, the

CIA estimated the chemical warfare agent had deteriorated to

approximately 18 percent purity by the time that bunker 2 was

destroyed, in early February 1991, leaving about 1600 kilograms (1.6

metric tons) of viable sarin. The CIA based its estimate on UNSCOM's

analysis of Iraqi purity data and supporting information, which stated

that the munitions were filled with the agent in 1988 and that the

maximum purity for the 1988 agent was 18 percent in 1991. However, this

assumption suggests knowledge of exact production dates and storage

conditions that were not established. But UNSCOM and intelligence

community reporting about the near-wartime capabilities of Iraq

suggests that while the sarin produced was of poor quality, it had a

maximum purity of 60 per cent.


According to CIA documents, the total amount of agent modeled to have

been released at Al Muthanna was 1 kg, but, to be conservative, the

amount released was assumed to be 10 kg. The reasoning given for the

low amounts discharged was the heat of the explosion. The CIA assessed

that far less agent would have been released in the Al Muthanna bunker

because, based on U.S. field-testing using simulated bunkers, heat

would build up rapidly in Iraqi bunkers made of thick reinforced

concrete ceiling and walls, thereby destroying most of the agent.

However, these bumkers were targeted using high explosives, such as

Tomahawk missiles and laser-guided and non-guided bombs, that detonate

and produce instantaneous and extreme blast forces and shock and

pressure waves, as well as heat. While the CIA analysts gave great

credibility to the heat, no consideration was given to either the blast

effects of the munitions or to the higher altitude plumes generated

with the types of munitions used.


For Muhammadiyat, DOD also provided details regarding how they derived

source term characterizations for agent released using test data from

Dugway Proving Grounds. However, the types of munitions used in the

testing and, therefore, the resulting effects are not comparable to

what munitions were actually used and their effects. At Dugway Proving

Grounds, small explosive charges were placed on boxed rockets; at

Muhammadiyat, the munitions were targeted using multiple high-explosive

bombs. Agent purity at Muhammadiyat was estimated at 15 percent.


The Plume Height Was Underestimated:


Plume heights from the explosions could be significantly higher than

the plume height assumptions provided for in the modeling of Khamisiyah

and other Iraqi chemical warfare sites. The plume height data the CIA

provided for the demolitions at the Khamisiyah pit was 0-100 meters.

However, neither the DOD nor the CIA conducted testing to establish

plume heights associated with the bombings of Al Muthanna,

Muhammadiyat, or Ukhaydir. DOD modelers involved with the modeling

efforts told us that they did not calculate the plume height or any of

the other heat or blast effects associated with the bombings of these

sites because DOD had provided the modelers these data. A modeling

expert from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) told us that DOD

data on plume height was inconsistent with other test data for the

types of facilities bombed. The modeling expert cited test studies

conducted at White Sands Proving Grounds in New Mexico, which

demonstrated plume heights would range from 300 to 400 meters in

height.


Modeling experts from LLNL who participated only in the initial

modeling at Khamisiyah also told us, citing studies, that they

questioned how the plume height was estimated. In a pre-war analysis,

LLNL projected that the smoke source cloud, immediately following the

bombing of Iraqi chemical warfare agent facilities, would be

characterized by a surface-based plume with a 54 meter (177 ft.)

horizontal radius and a height of 493 meters (1,617 ft.). A Sandia

Laboratory empirical study, performed in 1969, established a power law

formula for calculating plume heights attributable to high-explosive

detonations (see appendix II). Using this formula, an MK-84 or GBU-24

(942.6lb. of high explosives) bomb would generate a plume of 421

meters.


DOD applied the same assumptions about the height of the plume at

Khamisiyah to model other possible chemical releases at the Al

Muthanna, Muhammadiyat, and Ukhaydir sites. At Muhammadiyat, for

example, DOD established a release height of 0.5 meters (roughly half

the bomb height) for nerve agent and a release height of 1.0 meters

(roughly half of the median height of the various bomb stacks) for

blister (mustard) agent destroyed at this location. Moreover, according

to an internal DOD memo, an initial cloud size of 10 meters in both

lateral and vertical directions was "arbitrarily" established. No

efforts were made by DOD to validate these estimates by analyzing video

images that were available showing some of the plume data, particularly

those taken from ground level at Khamisiyah, were used to project the

characteristics of the actual plumes.


As illustrated by figure 1, disparity in plume height source data could

result in vastly differing projections regarding how far the plume

travels and disperses, particularly during nighttime periods when a

stable (nocturnal) boundary layer emerges.


Figure 1: Boundary Layer Characteristics:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]



As also shown in figure 1, above the surface layer, in the stable

boundary layer, the winds often accelerate to higher speeds, in a

phenomenon that is called the low-level or nocturnal jet. At altitudes

on the order of 200 meters above the ground, winds may reach 10-30

meters per second (22-67.5 miles per hour) in the nocturnal jet. Higher

plumes than those postulated by DOD, coupled with this phenomenon,

could result in the rapid transport of chemical agents until disturbed

by turbulence or the return of the mixed layer sometime after dawn.

However, this possibility was not taken into consideration in any of

the modeling performed. Consequently, the modeling may have resulted in

underestimating the extent of plume coverage. (For a detailed

discussion of this issue, see appendix II.):


In addition, plume geometry associated with high-explosive discharges

shows that the majority of the mass of the plume is located toward the

higher altitudes, suggesting that the majority of the mass of the plume

would move to higher altitues where they might be transported by these

higher speed winds (see appendix III).


DOD Modeling Only Considered the Effects of a Single Bombing on Health:


Iraqi chemical warfare facilities were bombed on several occasions, but

DOD and CIA modeling did not reflect the cumulative effects of these

repeated bombings on the amounts of agents released and on the health

of troops. For example, there were 17 distinct coalition air strikes on

the Muhammadiyat ammunition storage depot. While modeling was requested

for the duration of 72 hours after the chemical release for Khamisiyah,

DOD used only a 24-hour duration for its modeling of the bombing of

Muhammadiyat. This was because at this site, unlike at others, DOD made

the assumption that all of the nerve agent was released at one time and

therefore modeled each air strike as if it was the only strike that

caused a release. According to DOD, each model produced a freeze frame

of the largest hazard area. The hazard area grows until it reaches its

maximum size, which the modeling suggests is about 10-12 hours after

the release.


Dugway Field-testing Did Not Realistically Simulate the Actual Bombing

Conditions:


DOD and the CIA also conducted post-war field-testing at Dugway Proving

Ground to simulate the actual bombing conditions at Khamisiyah to

derive the source term data for use in modeling. From May 1997 through

November 1999, the testing center at Dugway Proving Ground conducted

seven field-testings and two laboratory studies to obtain source term

data for use in DOD and CIA modeling of Khamisiyah. For testing and

simulation to be effective, the conditions have to be as close to the

actual event as possible. However, the testing did not realistically

simulate the conditions that existed during the demolition of 122-mm

chemical-filled rockets in Khamisiyah and is therefore of questionable

usefulness in providing inputs data for the modeling. The simulations

took place under conditions that were not comparable to those that

existed at Khamisiyah. During the field-testing, there were differences

in seasonal and meteorological conditions; in munition crate

construction material; in rocket construction, including the use of

concrete-filled pipes as rocket replacements to provide (inert) filler

to simulate larger stacks; the fewer numbers of rockets (and therefore

explosives) in the simulations, which may have suppressed a potential

chain reaction of explosions; the use of agent simulant (rather than

real agent); and soil. These differences result in multi-variable

uncertainty that cannot be resolved.


For example, the Dugway testing used a small sample of 32 rockets with

simulant-filled warheads to conduct seven field-testings: five were

single-rocket demolitions and two involved multiple-rocket

demolitions. One multiple-rocket trial demolition used nine functional

rockets plus three dummy rockets, while the other multiple-rocket trial

used 19 functional rockets and five dummy rockets. In contrast, at the

Khamisiyah pit, stacks of 122 mm rockets, estimated to total about

1,250 rockets, were detonated. Moreover, Dugway testing officials did

not know whether the 122 mm rockets used during the field-testings were

the same as those at the Khamisiyah pit. Dugway officials acknowledged

that exploding a larger number of rockets would make a significant

difference on the testing, and aerial bombing with a heavy load would

have a far greater effect than was the case with the Dugway testing.


According to DOD and CIA analysts, the type of soil and wood can have a

significant effect on the dispersion of the agent. However, a Dugway

testing official told us that evaporation characteristics from the

trials and models were uncertain. DOD and CIA estimates of the

evaporation and retention rates of the chemical agent spilled on the

soil may not be similar to what was actually evaporated from and

retained in the pit sand at Khamisiyah. This is because while Iraqi

soil was available and used in the laboratory testing, it was not used

during the field-testing. Similarly, DOD and the CIA estimates of the

amount of spilled agent that evaporated from and was retained in wooden

crates are suspect because Dugway testing officials could not obtain

actual wood from the Khamisiyah pit site for testing. The aged and

possibly damp wood at Khamisiyah would absorb less agent than the new

wood used at Dugway. DOD and CIA determined that only about 32 percent

of the agent was released and that most leaked into the soil and wood

with 18 percent of the leakage becoming part of the plume (2 percent

through aerosolization and 16 percent through evaporation).


Field-testings were also conducted at a different time of the year and

time of the day than the actual Khamisiyah pit event. According to

Dugway officials, testing was done in May and in the early morning

hours when drainage conditions prevail. The U.S. demolition of the

Khamisiyah pit took place on March 10th, in the late afternoon during

the presence of a mixing layer. Other demolitions took place during

evening and nighttime hours when the stable (nocturnal) boundary layer

emerges.


Despite the uncertainties in approximating the conditions that existed

even at Khamisiyah, DOD and the CIA used these data not only for the

Khamisiyah modeling, but also for the modeling of other sites. At all

these sites, the chemical warfare munitions would have been destroyed

by air strikes with much greater quantities of high-explosive charges

and under differing meteorological conditions.


Divergence in Results among the Models:


DOD made no effort to resolve widely divergent modeling results among

the models selected. Instead, a composite model approach was taken,

which contributed to, rather than resolved, uncertainty.


For example, the DOD panel tasked the LLNL to conduct an analysis using

DOD's MATHEW meteorological model with the ADPIC dispersion model.

During LLNL presentations to the DOD panel in November 1996 and

February 1997, the LLNL provided a 72-hour composite projection,

assuming an instantaneous release of the contents of 550 rockets

containing sarin. It shows the plume covering an area extending south-

southeast from the release point to the Persian Gulf, then turning

eastward at the Gulf coast, and then turning northeast over the Gulf

and extending northeastward across central Iran. (For a more detailed

discussion of this topic, see appendix IV.):


DOD models showed significant differences from the LLNL assessment. In

contrast to the LLNL modeling simulations, analysis done with the DOD

models--VLSTRACK with COAMPS meteorological models and HPAC/SCIPUFF

with OMEGA meteorological forecasting models--showed the plume from an

instantaneous release moving first southerly, and then turning to the

west-southwest. See appendix V for a 72-hour plume overlay of those

composite projections published by DOD.


According to the DOD panel, no effort was made to reconcile the

differences between the DOD and LLNL modeling efforts. The panel

determined that the results were so different that it would not be

possible to choose the most affected areas and which U.S. forces were

affected. Accordingly, the panel recommended that a composite of the

DOD models be used to combine the hazard areas predicted by the models.

Yet we observed that even among the models selected for use by DOD,

widely differing paths were evident (see appendix VI).


Assuming that a composite modeling effort is an appropriate

methodology, a composite projection, including the above projections

(DOD and CIA composite and LLNL), would encompass a far larger number

of forces and seriously skew the outcome of any epidemiological studies

done thus far, as shown in figure 2.


Figure 2: DOD Composite Projection and Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory Projection:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]


A clear divergence exists in the predictions of the models. Further

research was conducted to determine whether there was data available

that might explain this divergence. As a result of this research, the

DOD panel concluded that the divergence in the modeling outcomes may be

explained by a line of diffluence (directional split) in the

independently modeled 10-mm wind field data near Khamisiyah during the

first 2 days of the modeling period. The precise location of this line

was critical to which way the material would be transported by the

wind. (See appendix VII for an illustration of this diffluence with

three different data sets).


In addition, DTRA officials told us that at the time of the modeling,

they conducted data-validation runs of the various models against

visible smoke plumes from the oil well fires in Kuwait; the runs showed

a definite bias, as shown in figure 3. According to DTRA, this

validation could mean that the uncertainty involved in using these

models could result in an angular shift of 10 to 50 degrees to the

west. In other words, the actual area coverd could be from 10 to 50

degrees to the east of the area indicated by the model, meaning that it

would cover a different population from the one in the model.


Figure 3: Validation Runs of Various Models:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]


DOD's Conclusion from the Epidemiological Studies Is Questionable:


Given that the DOD modeling was flawed, DOD's conclusion, from

epidemiological studies based on this modeling with regard to rate of

illness among exposed versus not exposed, is questionable.


Nevertheless, the results of the modeling were used as a basis for

determining the exposure classification--exposed versus not exposed to

chemical agents--of the troops in population-based epidemiological

studies. As we noted in 1997, to ascertain the causes of veterans'

illnesses, it is imperative that investigators have valid and reliable

information on exposure, especially for low-level or intermittent

exposures to chemical warfare agents.[Footnote 4] To the extent that

veterans are misclassified regarding exposure, relationships would be

obscured and conclusions would be misleading.


Misclassification of study subjects in the measurement of the variables

being compared is a well-recognized methodological problem in

epidemiological studies. Misclassification can have two types of

effects. First, if misclassification affects both comparison groups

equally (non-differential--equally in the exposed and unexposed

groups), it may water down the results so that important associations

are missed. Second, if misclassification affects one group more than

the other (differential misclassification), it may introduce bias that

obscures important associations or creates false associations.

Consequently, the study misclassification resulted in confounding--

that is, distorting--the results, making the conclusion questionable.


By combining the results from its individual modeling efforts, which

showed different areas of coverage, and ignoring the results of the

LLNL modeling, which showed much larger areas of coverage, DOD

potentially may have misclassified a large number of troops truly

exposed to chemical warfare agents in the putatively non-exposed group.

If exposure to chemical warfare agents truly caused adverse effects

resulting in increased hospitalization or death, such one-way

misclassification would tend to obscure the differences in

hospitalization or death rates by falsely increasing the rates in the

putatively non-exposed group while not affecting the rates in the

exposed group.


Based on the June 1996 plume modeling, DOD officials initially stated

that only 300 to 400 troops were exposed to chemical plumes. Based on

additional modeling, that number was revised to approximately 5000 on

September 1996; to approximately 20,000 on October 22, 1996; and to

98,910 on July 23, 1997. DOD 2000 estimates place the number exposed at

101,752. The number from the October 22, 1997 plume model served as the

basis for informing approximately 100,000 Gulf War veterans of possible

exposure. This 1997 plume model was also used as the basis of at least

two epidemiological studies that were published in peer-reviewed

scientific journals.


In 2000 DOD announced that as a result of ongoing scientific analysis,

DOD's Directorate for Deployment Health Support developed a new

computer model that changed the location of the Khamisiyah plume

footprint. The number of service members potentially exposed remained

approximately 100,000. The new 2000 model reclassified 32,627 troops as

unexposed who were previously classified as exposed and classified

35,771 troops as exposed who were previously classified as unexposed.

Given the weaknesses in DOD modeling and the inconsistency of data set-

-representing these models--given to different researchers, there can

be no confidence that the research conclusions based on these models

have any validity.


Conclusions:


In evaluating the limitations of the plume modeling, we concluded that

even under the best of the circumstances, the results from the modeling

cannot be definitive. Plume modeling can allow one to estimate what

might have happened when chemical warfare agents are released in the

environments. Mathematical equations are used to predict the activities

of an actual event, in this case, the direction and extent of the

chemical warfare agent plume. However, in order to predict precisely,

one needs to have accurate information on the source term and the

meteorological conditions. However, DOD did not have accurate

information on the source term or on meteorological conditions.


Given these modeling flaws, the DOD modeling results should not form

the basis for determining the extent of exposure of U.S. troops during

the Gulf War. The models selected were not fully developed and

validated for environmental fallout and the assumptions used to provide

the input into the models exhibited a preferential bias for a

particular and limited outcome. Yet even under these circumstances, the

models failed to provide similar conclusions. In addition, many

potential exposure events were not included. It is likely that if fully

developed and validated models and more realistic data for source term

were included in the modeling, particularly plume height and exposure

duration, the exposure footprints would be much larger and most likely

to cover most of the areas where U.S. and other coalition forces were

deployed. However, given the weaknesses in the data available for any

further analyses, any further modeling efforts on this issue would not

be any more accurate and helpful.


In particular, source term data used for modeling the release of

chemical warfare agents during the Gulf War were inadequate for any

model to provide, with the desired accuracy and confidence, a single

definitive simulation of dispersion. Several modeling experts told us

that if source term inputs into modeling assessments are not accurate,

the results of the modeling would not be reliable The development of

source term data was not empirically driven, but rather driven by the

subjective analyses of individual intelligence agencies. No empirically

driven analyses were applied to determine plume height source data from

the chemical warfare agent research, production, and storage sites

subjected to air strikes, and no empirically driven calculations were

disclosed regarding agent purity as it affected the rate of decay of

the chemical warfare agent munitions that, according to intelligence

agencies reports, were produced immediately prior to the war.


Efforts to simulate events and define the source term through testing

were unrealistic, conducted under inappropriate conditions and, in some

cases, inappropriately applied to dissimilar events. The subjective and

defective quality of much of the analyses conducted is best

demonstrated by the dynamic nature of the source data over time. That

is, repeated analyses resulted in continually changing conclusions and

source data, despite the fact that no aspect of the actual events

changed after their occurrence.


DOD completely disregarded the results from the LLNL model which

provided divergent results, which were in the DOD and CIA modeling

analysis. This occurred despite a high degree of divergence, even among

the selected DOD models. Further, the precise plume projections of the

LLNL model were excluded from DOD's composite modeling. Finally, in the

DOD and CIA composite model, divergence from individual models was

masked. Despite all of the uncertainties that emerged from DOD and CIA

modeling, the results of the modeling were used to serve as a basis for

determining the exposure status--exposed versus not exposed to chemical

agents--of the troops in population-based epidemiological studies.

However, given the weaknesses in DOD modeling and the inconsistency of

data set--representing these models--given to different researchers,

there can be no confidence that the research conclusions based on these

models have any validity.


Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer

any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.


Contacts and Acknowledgments:


Should you or your offices have any questions concerning this report,

please contact me at (202) 512-6412 or Sushil Sharma, Ph.D., DrPH, at

(202) 512-3460. We can also be reached by e-mail at rhodesk@gao.gov and

sharmas@gao.gov. Individuals who made key contributions to this

testimony were Jason Fong and Laurel Rabin. James J. Tuite III, a GAO

consultant, provided technical expertise.


[End of section]


Appendix I: Khamisiyah Models:


On November 2, 1996, DOD requested the Institute for Defense Analysis

to convene an independent panel of experts in meteorology, physics,

chemistry, and related disciplines to review the Khamisiyah modeling

analysis done by the CIA and its contractor, the Science Applications

International Corporation. The DOD panel recommended conducting

additional analyses using several DOD and non-DOD meteorological and

dispersion models as shown in table 1.


Table 1: Meteorological and Dispersion Models Used in Modeling

Khamisiyah:


Meteorological Model: Coupled Ocean-Atmosphere Mesoscale Prediction

System (COAMPS); Developer/Sponsor: U.S. Navy; Dispersion Model: Hazard

Prediction and Assessment Capability/Second Order Closure, Integrated

Puff (HPAC/SCIPUFF); Developer/Sponsor: Defense Threat Reduction

Agency.


Meteorological Model: Mass Consistent Wind Field (MATHEW); Developer/

Sponsor: Department of Energy/Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;

Dispersion Model: Atmospheric Dispersion by Particle-in-cell (ADPIC);

Developer/Sponsor: Department of Energy/Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory.


Meteorological Model: Mesoscale Model, Version 5 (MM5); Developer/

Sponsor: National Center for Atmospheric Research; Dispersion Model:

Non-Uniform Simple Surface Evaporation, Version 4 (NUSSE4); Developer/

Sponsor: U.S. Army.


Meteorological Model: Naval Operational Global Atmospheric Prediction

System (NOGAPS); Developer/Sponsor: U.S. Navy; Dispersion Model: Vapor

Liquid Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK); Developer/Sponsor: U.S. Navy.


Meteorological Model: Operational Multi-scale Environment Model with

Grid Adaptivity (OMEGA); Developer/Sponsor: Defense Threat Reduction

Agency; Dispersion Model: [Empty]; Developer/Sponsor: [Empty].


Source: GAO.


[End of table]


[End of section]


Appendix II: Power Law Formula:


A Sandia Laboratory empirical study performed in 1969 established a

power law formula for calculating plume heights attributable to high-

explosive detonations. This power law formula was derived from data on

23 test shots, ranging from 140-2,242 lbs. high explosives at U.S.

Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site (National Exercise, Test, and

Training Center) and provides a cloud top height at 2 minutes after

detonation. Most of the shots were detonated during near neutral

conditions, where the clouds continued to rise after 2 minutes; data

for 5 minutes after detonation on some shots shows tops rising to

nearly double the 2-minute values. The 2-minute values better represent

the final cloud top heights during stable conditions.


This formula is represented as:


h = 76(w^1/4):


where h = height of plume in meters

and, w = weight of explosives in pounds:


Using this formula, a MK-84 or GBU-24 (942.6lb of high explosives) bomb

would generate a plume of 421 meters:


H = 76 (942.6 pounds of high explosives)^1/4

H = 76 (5.541)

H 421 meters:


Figure II.1 shows what the plume height trend line would be using the

formula to calculate plume heights, resulting from the detonation of

high explosives ranging in weight from 100 - 2,000 lbs.


Figure 4: Plume Height by Weight of Explosive:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]


[End of section]


Appendix III: Plume Geometries and Wind Transport:


As shown in figure III.1, plume geometry associated with high explosive

discharges shows that the majority of the mass of the plume is located

towards the higher altitudes, suggesting that the majority of the mass

of the plume would move to higher altitudes where they might be

transported by higher speed winds.


Figure 5: Examples of Various Plume Geometries:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]


As shown in figure 3.2, the distribution of the plume geometry may be

affected by nocturnal jets.


Figure 6: Impact of Nocturnal Jets on Plume at Higher Altitudes:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]



In fact, empirical studies and actual reported and observed events tend

to refute DOD and intelligence agencies' assumptions and support the

alternative assumption of transport by low-level jets. First, empirical

testing suggests that the plume heights were much higher than

postulated in the source term data. Second, no massive casualties were

claimed, reported or observed in areas immediately surrounding the

Iraqi chemical warfare research, production, and storage sites bombed

by coalition forces. Third, since many of the bombings occurred at

night, the explosive effects coupled with higher altitude plumes and

the presence of a nocturnal boundary layer capable of moving hazardous

materials hundreds of miles could easily account for this phenomenon,

as well as the reports of chemical warfare agent detections in areas

occupied by U.S. and coalition forces. Fourth, the dynamics of

advection explained above may account for the reported wartime

nighttime detections of very low-levels of chemical agents associated

with turbulence mixing the upper and lower level atmospheric layers

resulting from aircraft-related sonic booms and incoming missiles and

artillery.


[End of section]


Appendix IV: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Khamisiyah

Simulation:


The Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

(LLNL) Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability was tasked to conduct an

analysis using its MATHEW meteorological model with the ADPIC

dispersion model. Between 1979 and 2003, the LLNL modeling capability,

known as the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC), now the

National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), responded to more

than 100 alerts, accidents, and disasters, and supported more than

1,000 exercises. These include assessments of nuclear accidents, fires,

industrial chemical accidents, and terrorist threats.


During its presentations to the DOD panel in November 1996 and February

1997, scientists from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory provided

plume projections based on the data provided by the panel staff. A

number of model projections were calculated and presented to the panel.

As shown in figure IV.1, the LLNL 72-hour composite projection assuming

an instantaneous release of the contents of 550 rockets containing

sarin. It shows the plume covering an area extending south-southeast

from the release point to the Persian Gulf, then turning eastward at

the Gulf Coast, and then turning northeast over the Gulf and extending

northeastward across central Iran.


Figure 7: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Composite Projections:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]



LLNL's modeling assessment shows that the 72-hour exposure due to the

instantaneous release of sarin from 550 rockets covers a large hazard

area. According to LLNL, agent concentration in excess of the dosage

amount expected to cause "minimal effects" or symptoms on individuals

covered a 2,255 square km area extending approximately 130 km south-

southeast from the release point.[Footnote 5] Dosages in excess of the

amount that would be allowed for a worker exposed to sarin in the

workplace, or the "occupational limit,[Footnote 6]" were predicted over

a 114,468 square kilometer area, including Kuwait City, an

approximately 200 kilometer-wide area across the Persian gulf, and the

higher elevations of the Zagos mountain range in Iran. The remaining

area was determined to be at the "general population limit."[Footnote

7]


[End of section]


Appendix V: DOD Model Simulations:


A 72-hour plume overlay of those composite projections published by

OSAGWI is shown in figure V.1.


Figure 8: DOD Composite Projection:


[See PDF for image]


Note: This projection includes the VLSTRAK and SCIPIFF/HPAC dispersion

models with COAMPS, MM5, and OMEGA meteorological models.


[End of figure]


[End of section]


Appendix VI: Divergence among DOD Models:


Even among the models selected for use by the DOD panel, widely

divergent directional outcomes were observed. As shown in figure VI.1,

differences can be seen among various models for hazard areas during

the first 2 days of the modeling period for Khamisiyah.


Figure 9: Figure VI.1 Divergence among Models Used in Constructing DOD

and CIA Composite Analysis:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]


The March 10, 1991 graphic demonstrates a 40-45 degree divergence

between the HPAC/OMEGA and the HPAC/COAMPS projections while the March

11, 1991 graphic demonstrates approximately an 80 degree divergence.


The uncertainty attributed to this divergence is not limited to the

Khamisiyah modeling. According to a modeling analyst involved with the

modeling of Al Muthanna, the weather models used, COAMPS and OMEGA,

each showed the plume going in different directions, at a 110-120

degree difference. The analyst said that COAMPS showed the plume going

in a North/Northwest direction, while OMEGA showed the plume going

South. Similar divergence among model predictions was also observed in

the modeling of Muhammadiyat, as shown in figure VI.2.


Figure 10: Divergence in DOD Models for Muhammadiyat:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]


[End of section]


Appendix VII: Divergence and Wind Field Models:


In figure VII.1, windfield vector divergence projections 6.0 meters

above terrain are based on observational data processed by the

Meteorological Data Interpolation Code (MEDIC) model.


Figure 11: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Diagnostic Wind Model

Based on Observational Data:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]


In figure VII.2, the Windfield vector model based on European Centre

for Medium-Range Weather Forecast (ECMWF) projections, processed by the

Meteorological Data Interpolation Code (MEDIC) model, is shown.


Figure 12: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Diagnostic Wind Model

Based on ECMWF Projections:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]


In figure VII.3, the windfield vector model is based on Coupled Ocean-

Atmosphere Mesoscale Prediction System (COAMPS) Simulations at the U.S.

Naval Research Laboratories.


Figure 13: Windfield Vector Model Based on COAMPS:


[See PDF for image]


[End of figure]


[End of section]


FOOTNOTES


[1] Observations were few because Iraq stopped reporting weather

station measurement information to the World Meteorological

Organization in 1981. As a result, data on the meteorological

conditions during the Gulf War were sparse. The only data that were

available were for the surface wind observation site, 8
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